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RELIGIOUS TRUTH, PLURALISM, AND 
SECULARIZATION: THE SHAKING FOUNDATIONS 
OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 
Daniel O. Conkle∗
On Christ the solid Rock I stand, 
All other ground is sinking sand; 
All other ground is sinking sand. 
  —Edward Mote1
INTRODUCTION 
 
Twenty years ago, the Supreme Court dealt a blow to religious 
liberty.  In Employment Division v. Smith,2 the Court effectively 
overturned a quarter century of constitutional doctrine, reducing the 
protection of the Free Exercise Clause, in large measure, to an equality 
right as opposed to a liberty right.  Under the Court’s prior doctrine, the 
Free Exercise Clause required serious constitutional scrutiny of laws 
that imposed substantial burdens on religiously motivated conduct, 
scrutiny that sometimes resulted in constitutionally required, religion-
based exemptions for the religious believers whose freedom the laws 
impaired.3  According to Smith, by contrast, the Free Exercise Clause 
generally offers no protection for religiously motivated conduct, no 
matter how great the burden on religious liberty.  It protects religious 
 ∗  Robert H. McKinney Professor of Law, Nelson Poynter Scholar, and Adjunct Professor of 
Religious Studies, Indiana University Bloomington.  I presented an earlier version of this Essay 
on October 7, 2010 at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law of Yeshiva University, during a 
Symposium entitled Twenty Years After Employment Division v. Smith: Assessing the Twentieth 
Century’s Landmark Case on the Free Exercise of Religion and How It Changed History.  
Thanks to Professor Marci Hamilton and to the Cardozo Law Review for including me in this 
Symposium, and to my fellow Symposium participants for their helpful comments on my Essay.  
Copyright 2011 by Daniel O. Conkle. 
 1 Edward Mote, My Hope Is Built, available at http://www.cyberhymnal.org/ 
htm/m/y/myhopeis.htm.  The hymn was originally published in EDWARD MOTE, HYMNS OF 
PRAISE (1836). 
 2 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 3 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
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equality by prohibiting laws that target religious conduct for 
discriminatory treatment, but such laws are rare.4
In the broader scheme of things, however, religious liberty remains 
relatively vibrant and robust in the United States.  Notwithstanding 
Smith, the Free Exercise Clause is not meaningless, because some laws 
do discriminate against religion.5  And when the government 
discriminates against religious speech, the Free Speech Clause offers 
corresponding constitutional protection.6  In addition, Congress has 
resurrected pre-Smith legal standards through religious liberty statutes—
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA)7 and the 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 
(RLUIPA)8—that protect religious practices even from neutral, 
nondiscriminatory laws.  Although the Supreme Court invalidated 
RFRA in its state and local applications,9 the Court has applied the law 
vigorously in the federal-law context.10  And it has rejected an 
Establishment Clause attack on RLUIPA, which reaches state and local 
lawmaking in select settings, ruling that Congress is free to extend 
religious liberty beyond the confines of Smith.11  States, too, have 
considerable discretion to protect religious liberty more broadly than 
Smith demands, and many have done so, either through their own 
religious liberty statutes or as a matter of state constitutional law.12
The scope of religious liberty is a matter of ongoing debate.  In the 
short term, this debate is likely to include questions concerning the 
proper meaning of RFRA and RLUIPA, as well as the question of 
whether Smith’s interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause itself should 
be revisited or refined.  Needless to say, these questions deserve careful 
attention.  No matter how these and other specific issues are resolved, 
however, America’s basic commitment to religious liberty remains 
intact, at least for now.  But can this commitment survive over time?  
Will we continue to support religious liberty as an important 
constitutional value and a fundamental human right?  This question may 
be less urgent than the more immediate issues that confront us, but it is 
 4 For a competing view of Smith, contending that it was not a dramatic or surprising 
doctrinal innovation, see MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE 
OF LAW 220-27 (2005). 
 5 See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
 6 See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Rosenberger v. 
Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches 
Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993). 
 7 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1 to 2000bb-4 (2006).
 8 Id. § 2000cc to 2000cc-5. 
 9 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 10 See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006). 
 11 See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005). 
 12 See EUGENE VOLOKH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND RELATED STATUTES: PROBLEMS, 
CASES AND POLICY ARGUMENTS 975-76 (3d ed. 2008). 
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no less significant.  And if I am correct, dramatic changes in the 
American religious landscape—developments that have accelerated in 
the two decades following Smith—suggest that the long-term future of 
American religious liberty may be in jeopardy.13
In Part I of this Essay, I begin by recounting John Locke’s 
arguments for religious toleration, which included a religious-moral 
argument grounded in Christianity and a political-pragmatic argument 
based on religious pluralism.  Part II explains how Locke’s arguments, 
and variations upon them, have supported the development and spread 
of religious liberty.  In Part III, I suggest that a good part of the 
explanation lies in a growing recognition that religious liberty finds 
support in the teachings of not only Christianity but a variety of other 
religions.  The Essay then turns in Part IV to developments and trends 
in the American religious landscape, including the diversification, 
modernization, and individualization of religion as well as the 
increasing impact of secularization, both within religion and outside of 
it.  In Part V, I suggest that these developments and trends, over time, 
may seriously threaten our society’s acceptance of the underlying 
justifications for religious liberty and therefore our societal commitment 
to religious liberty as a fundamental value.  I end the Essay with a brief, 
and rather pessimistic, conclusion. 
 
I.     “THE LOCKEAN REVOLUTION”: JOHN LOCKE’S  
RELIGIOUS-MORAL AND POLITICAL-PRAGMATIC  
ARGUMENTS FOR RELIGIOUS TOLERATION 
 
The basic issue of religious toleration—and, more broadly, 
religious liberty—arises from the existence of competing claims of 
religious truth.  Should nation-states tolerate or grant religious freedom 
to those who reject the dominant religious view, that is, to those who 
embrace some other religion or no religion at all?  In Western history, 
states initially reasoned that they should not.  But then came John Locke 
and the emergence and growth of religious toleration and religious 
liberty. 
Prior to what Professor W. Cole Durham, Jr., has called “the 
Lockean revolution,”14 governments in the Western world tended 
 13 I formulated the basic thesis of this Essay while teaching from Professor Leslie C. Griffin’s 
excellent casebook, including especially chapters nine and ten, which directed me to some of the 
sources that I cite here.  See LESLIE C. GRIFFIN, LAW AND RELIGION: CASES AND MATERIALS 
619-703 (2007). 
 14 W. Cole Durham, Jr., Perspectives on Religious Liberty: A Comparative Framework, in 
RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 1, 7 (Johan D. van 
der Vyver & John Witte, Jr. eds., 1996). 
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toward regimes of coerced religion.  European states (and American 
colonies) embraced different views concerning the proper meaning of 
Christianity.  Many maintained formal religious establishments, 
complete with coerced religious conformity, taxes supporting the 
established religion, and compelled religious observance.  The 
underlying justification for such an approach was two-fold, resting in 
part on religious-moral reasoning and in part on political and pragmatic 
concerns.15
From a religious-moral perspective, it was widely understood that 
there is but one true religion, and the leaders of each nation-state, of 
course, believed that their own version of Christianity was that one.  
Individuals who embraced a competing religious perspective were 
deluded, as were those who rejected religion altogether.  The state 
properly demanded that these dissenters cease their heresy and follow 
the true commands of God.  By insisting upon religious conformity, the 
states themselves were honoring God by using the power of the state to 
force all citizens—and therefore the polity as a whole—to honor God’s 
will.  In addition, they were furthering, paternalistically, the individual 
religious well-being of their citizens, including dissenters, by leading 
them down the one true path to religious salvation.  The dissenters 
undoubtedly disagreed, but they were deluded in their false beliefs.  
Coercing religious truth was in the interest of all.16
This religious-moral justification was joined by a more pragmatic, 
political justification for maintaining an established religion to which all 
citizens were required to adhere.  In particular, it was believed that 
enforcing a common religion promoted the state’s interest in political 
stability and social peace, and that it did so in two related ways.  First, 
the religion served as a type of social glue, unifying society by giving 
citizens a uniform sense of meaning and purpose.  Second, the state’s 
promotion of this religion encouraged a reciprocal, religion-based 
motivation for supporting and obeying the governing regime.  As a 
result, the religious establishment not only brought citizens together but 
also promoted their allegiance to the state that governed them.17
 15 See id. 
 16 As Professor Griffin has explained, this view conformed to the teaching of Saint 
Augustine, who argued that “it is good for individuals to be brought to the truth by any means, 
including the use of force.”  Leslie C. Griffin, Fighting the New Wars of Religion: The Need for a 
Tolerant First Amendment, 62 ME. L. REV. 23, 28 (2010); see id. at 28-29. 
 17 From the time of the post-Constantinian Roman Empire, “it was a universal assumption 
that the stability of the social order and the safety of the state demanded the religious solidarity of 
all the people in one church.”  Winfred E. Garrison, Characteristics of American Organized 
Religion, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., Mar. 1948, at 14, 16.  This “theory of 
compulsory solidarity was . . . of Roman Catholic origin, . . . but it was also taken over by the 
major divisions of Protestantism in so far as these secured establishment as state churches.”  Id. at 
17. 
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In the late seventeenth century, John Locke proposed a dramatic 
change of thinking that furthered the adoption and spread of religious 
toleration and religious liberty.  In his 1689 Letter Concerning 
Toleration,18 Locke challenged both prongs of the traditional 
justification for coercive religious establishments even as he reaffirmed 
the idea of religious truth.19  In so doing, Locke offered his own 
competing arguments, both religious-moral and political-pragmatic. 
In his principal argument, Locke contended that the traditional 
religious-moral reasoning was flawed because, in reality, a coercive 
religious establishment does not conform to true religion.  True 
Christianity, Locke argued, teaches that religious salvation requires 
inward sincerity and personal faith, meaning that “men cannot be forced 
to be saved.”20  Coerced religion simply has no religious value.  
Accordingly, a state that compels religious observance engenders 
hypocrisy but does not honor God, and neither does it serve the 
religious well-being of individuals.  Much to the contrary, a state honors 
the will of God and best serves individual religious well-being by 
permitting genuine religious observance as a matter of voluntary 
choice.21
More briefly, Locke also contested the political-pragmatic 
argument for coercive establishments.  In a religiously pluralistic 
society, he suggested, religious toleration is politically and 
pragmatically preferable.  Forcing dissenters to practice a religion they 
reject promotes resentment and anger, not social unity and religion-
based support for the state.  Conversely, tolerance for competing views 
gives citizens, including religious minorities, a sense of belonging that 
in turn promotes the state’s interest in political stability and social 
peace.  According to Locke, the social-glue argument fails as contrasted 
with the “greater . . . security of government where all good subjects, of 
whatsoever Church they be, without any distinction upon account of 
religion, enjoy[] the same favour of the prince and the same benefit of 
the laws, . . . [thus] becom[ing] the common support and guard of it.”22
 18 JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (William Popple trans., 1689), 
reprinted in 33 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 1 (Mortimer J. Adler ed., 2d ed. 1990). 
 19 See id. at 4 (noting that there is “but one truth, one way to heaven”). 
 20 Id. at 10. 
 21 See id. at 3-4, 10, 11.  Antecedents of Locke’s religious-moral argument for religious 
toleration can be found in Christian writings as far back as the third and fourth centuries.  See E. 
Gregory Wallace, Justifying Religious Freedom: The Western Tradition, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 
485, 495-530 (2009). 
 22 LOCKE, supra note 18, at 19; see id. at 18-19; Durham, supra note 14, at 8. 
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II.     LOCKE’S LEGACY: HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY 
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE  
UNITED STATES AND ABROAD 
 
Locke himself supported only a restricted regime of religious 
toleration,23 but his arguments commonly and properly have been 
understood to support religious liberty more generally.  Locke’s 
arguments and variations upon them, moreover, have been used to 
promote religious liberty both in the United States and abroad.  In early 
American history, for example, variants of Locke’s religious-moral 
argument were advanced by Roger Williams, who pre-dated Locke, and 
later by Thomas Jefferson. 
Roger Williams, who founded colonial Rhode Island in 1636 as a 
haven of religious liberty,24 argued that “forced worship stinks in God’s 
nostrils,”25 whereas religious freedom—what Williams called “soul 
liberty”—is a human right precisely because it is a God-given right, no 
less than the right of a human to breathe.26  More broadly, Williams 
promoted the separation of church and state for religious reasons—to 
protect religion from contamination and corruption.  Thus, as Professor 
Mark DeWolfe Howe explained, Williams maintained that “government 
must have nothing to do with religion lest in its clumsy desire to favor 
the churches or its savage effort to injure religion it bring the 
corruptions of the wilderness into the holiness of the garden.”27
More than a century later, Thomas Jefferson authored the 
influential Virginia Act for Religious Freedom of 1786, which barred 
coerced religion and which declared religious freedom a natural right.28  
In support of the legislation, Jefferson offered various arguments, but he 
relied in part on a religious-moral justification that echoed Williams as 
well as Locke.  According to the Act’s preamble, “Almighty God hath 
 23 Much like the contemporary constitutional doctrine of Employment Division v. Smith, 494 
U.S. 872 (1990), Locke called for the protection of religious belief and profession and for 
freedom from religious discrimination, but he rejected religion-based exemptions from generally 
applicable laws.  See LOCKE, supra note 18, at 12-13, 15-16.  And even this limited degree of 
toleration seemingly did not extend, at least not fully, to Roman Catholics, Muslims, or 
nonbelievers.  See id. at 17-18. 
 24 See WILLIAM G. MCLOUGHLIN, RHODE ISLAND: A HISTORY 3-5 (1978). 
 25 PATRICIA U. BONOMI, UNDER THE COPE OF HEAVEN: RELIGION, SOCIETY, AND POLITICS 
IN COLONIAL AMERICA 35 (1986) (quoting Roger Williams). 
 26 See EDWIN S. GAUSTAD, ROGER WILLIAMS 95-96 (2005). 
 27 MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND 
GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 149 (1965).  For an elaboration of 
Roger Williams’ rich and complex views, see TIMOTHY L. HALL, SEPARATING CHURCH AND 
STATE: ROGER WILLIAMS AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (1998). 
 28 See Virginia Act for Religious Freedom, VA. CODE ANN. § 57-1 (2008) (enacted Jan. 16, 
1786). 
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created the mind free,” and “all attempts to influence it by temporal 
punishment, or burthens, or by civil incapacitations, tend only to beget 
habits of hypocrisy and meanness.”29  They “are a departure from the 
plan of the Holy Author of our religion, who being Lord both of body 
and mind, yet chose not to propagate it by coercions on either, as it was 
in his Almighty power to do.”30  The state ought not confer privileges 
and incapacities on the basis of religious opinion, the preamble 
continued, because it “tends only to corrupt the principles of that 
religion it is meant to encourage, by bribing with a monopoly of worldly 
honours and emoluments, those who will externally profess and 
conform to it.”31
Religious-moral justifications for religious liberty dominated in the 
founding period,32 but variants of Locke’s political-pragmatic argument 
also played a role.  For instance, in his 1785 Memorial and 
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments,33 James Madison, like 
his colleague Jefferson, relied heavily on theological arguments in 
supporting religious liberty as a matter of natural law and unalienable 
right.34  But he also emphasized the importance of religious equality, 
not only as a matter of natural right but also because it promotes 
peaceful coexistence and voluntary allegiance to the state.  According to 
Madison, a coercive religious establishment tends to 
“destroy . . . moderation and harmony . . . amongst its several sects,”35 
generating religion-based resentment and divisiveness and sometimes 
religion-based violence.36  This “malignant influence on the health and 
prosperity of the State” is an “enemy to the public quiet.”37  It invites 
widespread resistance by objecting citizens, which “tend[s] to enervate 
the laws in general, and to slacken the bands of Society.”38  By contrast, 
“[a] just government . . . will be best supported by protecting every 
citizen in the enjoyment of his Religion with the same equal hand which 
protects his person and property; by neither invading the equal rights of 
any Sect, nor suffering any Sect to invade those of another.”39
 29 Id. pmbl. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. 
 32 See Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse, 
140 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 154-66 (1991). 
 33 JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS 
(1785), reprinted in MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL ET AL., RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 49 
(2d ed. 2006). 
 34 Madison’s basic natural law argument appears at the outset of the Memorial and 
Remonstrance.  See id. at 49-50.  But additional religious—and specifically Christian—arguments 
appear throughout the document. 
 35 Id. at 52. 
 36 See id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. at 51. 
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Religious-moral justifications for religious liberty, as advanced by 
Locke, Williams, Jefferson, and Madison, are theological and 
philosophical arguments of principle and logic.  They do not depend 
upon cultural contingencies or contestable empirical claims.  By 
contrast, the political-pragmatic arguments of Locke and later Madison 
are prudential arguments that are based upon a contestable empirical 
claim: that religious liberty will produce greater political stability and 
peace than will a regime of religious orthodoxy.  The validity of this 
claim is likely to vary from one society to another, depending in part on 
the degree of religious pluralism in the society at hand: the greater the 
pluralism, the stronger the validity of the empirical claim. 
In any event, these two forms of argument—religious-moral, on 
the one hand, and political-pragmatic, on the other—served as the 
foundations of religious liberty as it emerged in the United States.  The 
full implications of these arguments were and remain a matter of debate.  
Read broadly, they require the state not only to offer vibrant protection 
for individual religious freedom but also to maintain a separation of 
church and state, perhaps including even our contemporary 
constitutional prohibition on governmental endorsement of preferred 
religious positions.40  In any event, the arguments at least support 
religious liberty in the sense of freedom from coercive governmental 
action. 
Religious liberty, albeit with significant variations, eventually 
gained broad acceptance not only in America but also in Europe and 
elsewhere.  Today, it is recognized in most of the world’s domestic 
constitutions.41  In addition, it is an international right.  The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, dating from 1948, declares that 
“[e]veryone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion,” including “freedom, either alone or in community with others 
and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, 
practice, worship and observance.”42  Similar language was adopted as 
part of the European Convention on Human Rights of 195343 and later 
 40 From a political-pragmatic perspective, the prohibition on endorsement might be 
understood to promote a religiously inclusive political community, thereby advancing religious 
harmony and political unity.  Cf. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (“Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full 
members of the political community . . . .”).  Conversely, one might argue that the pre-Lockean, 
social-glue argument remains valid to a degree.  According to this view, non-coercive, 
generalized symbolic support for religion can enhance societal and political unity.  Cf. Lee v. 
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 646 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (calling voluntary nonsectarian prayer 
in public ceremonies an “important unifying mechanism”). 
 41 See Durham, supra note 14, at 9-10. 
 42 Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 18, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). 
 43 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 
9(1), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953). 
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was incorporated into a global treaty, the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights.44  Under these international provisions, as 
under the First Amendment, religious belief is absolutely protected.45  
By contrast, and not surprisingly, states sometimes can justify the 
regulation of religiously motivated conduct, that is, conduct that 
“manifests” religious belief.46  Whatever the limitations, however, 
religious liberty today is broadly recognized as a fundamental human 
right.47
Religious liberty continues to rest on Lockean and related 
arguments, both religious-moral and political-pragmatic.  And the 
spread of religious liberty, in turn, can be traced to the ever-broadening 
recognition that these arguments are sound.  Indeed, Professor Durham 
contends that Locke’s political-pragmatic argument has become ever 
more persuasive in the face of continually expanding religious 
pluralism.  Not only has pluralism increased within individual countries, 
it also has taken on an increasingly global dimension.  On the global 
stage, every religion is a minority.  As a result, religious believers, 
whatever their dominance domestically, are increasingly aware that 
their fellow believers are minorities in other countries and therefore 
need the protection of religious liberty.  This sentiment adds an 
additional element to Locke’s political-pragmatic argument.  According 
to Durham, it further supports the recognition of religious liberty as a 
“genuinely international right.”48
 
III.     RELIGIOUS SUPPORT FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 
 
What, then, of the first and primary prong of Locke’s reasoning, 
his religious-moral justification for religious liberty?  Professor Durham 
contends that this argument, with variations, likewise has been 
increasingly accepted.49  For Christianity, the Second Vatican Council 
(“Vatican II”) marked a crucial development.  Through the Council’s 
 44 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 18(1), Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171. 
 45 See W. COLE DURHAM, JR. & BRETT G. SCHARFFS, LAW AND RELIGION: NATIONAL, 
INTERNATIONAL, AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 165 (2010). 
 46 See id. at 231-34. 
 47 This is not to deny that religious liberty faces profound challenges in portions of the 
Islamic world and elsewhere, especially on such issues as proselytism, conversion, and 
blasphemy.  See John Witte, Jr. & M. Christian Green, Religious Freedom, Democracy, and 
International Human Rights, 23 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 583 (2009). 
 48 Durham, supra note 14, at 1-2; see id. at 2, 11. 
 49 See id. at 10-11. 
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1965 Declaration on Religious Freedom (Dignitatis Humanae),50 the 
Roman Catholic Church declared that “the human person has a right to 
religious freedom” that “has its foundation in the very dignity of the 
human person, as this dignity is known through the revealed Word of 
God and by reason itself.”51  After Vatican II, Christianity in general, 
Protestant and Catholic alike, broadly embraced religious liberty as a 
matter of religious-moral principle.52
Non-Christian religious traditions, too, can and do offer religious-
moral justifications for religious liberty.  Judaism, for instance, can be 
understood to support religious liberty as a matter of Jewish theology.  
Thus, according to Rabbi David Novak, “the covenant between God and 
Israel did not become fully effective until the Jewish people voluntarily 
reaccepted it in the exile and during the days of the Second Temple,” 
and “the covenant between God and individual Jews [likewise is] not 
fully effective unless an individual Jew wants to be in the covenant 
under no external duress.”53  “That is why,” Novak continues, “Jews 
have welcomed willing gentile converts to Judaism but have not 
detained those Jews wanting to depart from Judaism.”54  Jewish 
theology, of course, is augmented by a tragic history of persecution, 
giving Jews additional and powerful reasons to support religious 
liberty.55
Eastern religions likewise tend to be broadly tolerant and therefore 
broadly supportive of religious liberty.  Traditional Hinduism, for 
example, is extremely tolerant.  As a polytheistic religion, Hinduism 
recognizes not only the existence of multiple paths to the truth but also 
the possibility that no single path is perfect or complete.56  Buddhism, if 
anything, is even more tolerant.  According to Buddhism, there is no 
such thing as universal religious truth.  Instead, the emphasis is on 
“suchness,” which recognizes and values the distinctiveness and 
particularity of everything in the universe, whether natural, divine, or 
 50 SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL, DECLARATION ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (DIGNITATIS 
HUMANAE) (1965), available at http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/ 
documents/vat-ii_decl_19651207_dignitatis-humanae_en.html. 
 51 Id.; see Charles E. Curran, Religious Freedom and Human Rights in the World and the 
Church: A Christian Perspective, in RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN NATIONS AND 
IN RELIGIONS 143, 151 (Leonard Swidler ed., 1986). 
 52 See Curran, supra note 51, at 144-53. 
 53 DAVID NOVAK, IN DEFENSE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 79-80 (2009). 
 54 Id. at 80; see id. at 62-80. 
 55 Because Jews tend to be minorities wherever they reside, their support for religious liberty 
may rest in part on pragmatic self-interest.  But even in Israel, which was established as a Jewish 
state, religious liberty is recognized, albeit with various complexities.  See Asher Maoz, Religious 
Human Rights in the State of Israel, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: 
LEGAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 14, at 349. 
 56 See Kana Mitra, Exploring the Possibility of Hindu-Muslim Dialogue, in RELIGIOUS 
LIBERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN NATIONS AND IN RELIGIONS, supra note 51, at 109, 114. 
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human.57  As Masao Abe has explained, Buddhism teaches that “you 
and I are equal in that each of us is realized in our own individuality and 
in our own personality.  Exactly the same is true with the divine and the 
human.”58  Buddhism therefore is inherently tolerant: “Since the 
realization of everything’s suchness or as-it-is-ness is itself the Buddhist 
faith, the deeper the Buddhist faith becomes the more tolerant the 
attitude toward other faiths.  In Buddhism, deep faith and true tolerance 
do not exclude one another but go together.”59
Islam presents a more complicated picture.  Under a restrictive 
reading of the Islamic tradition, Muslims are free to practice Islam but 
not to convert to another religion; Jews and Christians, as “People of the 
Book,” are free to worship in private but not to proselytize; and all 
others, categorized as “Unbelievers,” are afforded little or no religious 
freedom at all.60  But this restrictive view has been challenged from 
within, and it appears that Islam increasingly is understood to support a 
more generous regime of religious liberty.  Mohamed A. Elsanousi cites 
the following passages from the Qur’an: 
 
Let there be no compulsion in religion.61 
 
If it had been thy Lord’s will, they would all have believed,—all who are on 
earth! wilt thou then compel mankind, against their will, to believe!62 
 
To you be your Way, and to me mine.63
 
According to Elsanousi, these verses suggest a religious justification for 
religious liberty analogous to that offered by Thomas Jefferson in 
support of the Virginia Act for Religious Freedom.64  Further, as 
Professor Ali Khan has explained, the Prophet Muhammed himself, 
following his migration from Mecca, established an Islamic state in 
Medina with a constitution that permitted non-Muslims to practice their 
religion.65  These arguments support the view of Professor Mohammed 
 57 See Masao Abe, Religious Tolerance and Human Rights: A Buddhist Perspective, in 
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN NATIONS AND IN RELIGIONS, supra note 51, at 193, 
196-97. 
 58 Id. at 197. 
 59 Id. at 198. 
 60 See Abdullahi A. An-Na’im, Religious Minorities Under Islamic Law and the Limits of 
Cultural Relativism, 9 HUM. RTS. Q. 1, 11-12 (1987). 
 61 THE MEANING OF THE HOLY QUR’AN 2:256 (Abdullah Yusuf Ali trans., 10th ed. 1999) 
[hereinafter QUR’AN]; see Mohamed A. Elsanousi, A Growing Economic Power: Muslims in 
North America and Integration and Contribution to Social Justice, 9 J.L. SOC’Y 100, 111 (2008). 
 62 QUR’AN, supra note 61, at 10:99; see Elsanousi, supra note 61, at 111. 
 63 QUR’AN, supra note 61, at 109:6; see Elsanousi, supra note 61, at 113. 
 64 See Elsanousi, supra note 61, at 110-15. 
 65 See Ali Khan, Commentary on the Constitution of Medina, in UNDERSTANDING ISLAMIC 
LAW: FROM CLASSICAL TO CONTEMPORARY 205 (Hisham M. Ramadan ed., 2006).  Medina 
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Hashim Kamali that religious liberty has been a precept of Islam from 
the very beginning.66
Islamic support for religious liberty is neither universal nor 
unambiguous.67  The restrictive traditional understanding has not 
disappeared from view, especially on the question of Muslim 
apostasy.68  Nonetheless, there are powerful currents within Islam that 
support religious liberty as a matter of religious-moral principle, even 
with respect to apostasy,69 and additional “reform[] from within”70 is 
likely to promote this view in the years that lie ahead. 
Needless to say, not all religious believers support religious liberty.  
Religious believers can be quite intolerant.  This may be true for certain 
religious fundamentalists, for instance, whether Christian, Islamic, or 
otherwise.71  Even so, there is broad and growing support for religious 
liberty on the basis of religious-moral principle, not only within 
Christianity but also within the other major religions of the world.  This 
religious support for religious liberty is not merely political or 
pragmatic.  Much to the contrary, it is grounded in powerful claims of 
ultimate reality—claims concerning the will of God or the call to 
spiritual fulfillment; claims concerning the dignity and individuality of 
each and every human being; and claims affirming religious liberty as 
an intrinsic (God-given or natural) human right.  These are claims of 
religious truth, and they track Locke’s first and primary argument: that 
religious truth demands religious liberty. 
Although religious believers of virtually all stripes can find 
religious-moral support for religious liberty within their particular 
traditions, secularists are a different story.  As discussed below, there 
may be no persuasive secular-moral justification for religious liberty.  
As a result, secular support for religious liberty may rest entirely on 
included various tribes of Jews and pagans as well as Muslims.  See id. at 206-08.  According to 
Khan, the Medina Constitution is part of the Prophet’s Sunna, which is subordinate to the Qur’an 
but which here is fully compatible with Qur’anic principles.  See id. at 208. 
 66 See MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN ISLAM 87-89 (1997). 
 67 See ROBERT TRAER, FAITH IN HUMAN RIGHTS: SUPPORT IN RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS FOR A 
GLOBAL STRUGGLE 116-18 (1991).  The constitutions of predominately Muslim countries, 
influenced by divergent understandings of Islam as well as other considerations, reflect a broad 
range of views concerning the role of Islam and Islamic law and concerning the status of religious 
freedom and other individual rights.  See Tad Stahnke & Robert C. Blitt, The Religion-State 
Relationship and the Right to Freedom of Religion or Belief: A Comparative Textual Analysis of 
the Constitutions of Predominately Muslim Countries, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 947 (2005). 
 68 See ABDULLAH SAEED & HASSAN SAEED, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, APOSTASY AND ISLAM 
(2004). 
 69 See, e.g., Mohamed Talbi, Religious Liberty: A Muslim Perspective, in RELIGIOUS 
LIBERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN NATIONS AND IN RELIGIONS, supra note 51, at 175. 
 70 See An-Na’im, supra note 60, at 17 (urging such reform). 
 71 See Frederick Mark Gedicks, Spirituality, Fundamentalism, Liberty: Religion at the End of 
Modernity, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 1197, 1219-24 (2005). 
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Locke’s secondary, political-pragmatic justification: that religious 
liberty promotes political stability and social peace. 
 
IV.     CLOUDS ON THE HORIZON: THE CHANGING FACE OF  
RELIGION IN AMERICA 
 
As I noted at the outset, America’s basic commitment to religious 
liberty remains intact.  Moreover, this commitment is not likely to 
disappear anytime soon.  Yet, as I look to the future, I see clouds on the 
horizon. 
Our commitment to religious liberty is not merely a product of the 
First Amendment’s text, nor even its historical underpinnings.  Rather, 
it is a contemporary commitment, reflected, for example, in the broad 
congressional support for RFRA and RLUIPA.  It is a commitment 
grounded in contemporary thinking—the thinking not only of judges but 
also of political leaders and of the citizens they represent.  It is 
grounded in the belief, accepted by most Americans, that religious 
liberty deserves protection as a fundamental human right.  In other 
words, it rests on the normative appeal of religious liberty, not merely in 
the past but today.  And if this contemporary commitment ever 
disappears, the substance of religious liberty is likely to follow.  
Religious liberty might remain a formal part of our constitutional and 
legal structure, but, in practical reality, it might gradually wither away, 
no longer generating distinctive or meaningful constitutional or legal 
protection. 
The substance of religious liberty is linked to its persuasive appeal, 
and, as I have discussed, its persuasive appeal rests upon a combination 
of religious-moral and political-pragmatic reasoning.  These two sorts 
of justifications, with variations in their specifics, were persuasive to 
Americans in the past, and they remain so today.  But will they persuade 
in the future?  Four developments and trends in the American religious 
landscape may bear on this question. 
 
A.     Diversification 
 
First, religion in America has become radically diverse, and it is 
likely to become even more so in the decades that lie ahead.  As 
Professor Stephen J. Stein has explained, the history of American 
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religion has been a story of ever-increasing religious diversity.72  There 
was significant diversity from the beginning, although (apart from the 
indigenous Native American population) it was confined mainly to 
competing Protestant denominations and sects.73  As immigration 
patterns changed, large numbers of Roman Catholics came to the United 
States, which dramatically changed the religious composition of the 
society.  By the time of the Civil War, the Roman Catholic Church had 
become the largest religious denomination in the country, and it grew 
even further in the decades that followed.74  There was significant 
Jewish immigration as well.75  America was no longer a Christian 
nation, much less a Protestant nation. 
In the 1950s, Professor Will Herberg described American religion 
in terms of “Protestant-Catholic-Jew.”76  This was a largely accurate 
characterization at the time, but Herberg could not anticipate later 
developments, including new waves of immigration from Asia, Africa, 
and Latin America, that have rendered it woefully incomplete.  Today, 
as Professor Diana L. Eck argues, the United States may be “the most 
religiously diverse nation on earth.”77  As in the past, there are 
significant denominational and theological differences within the 
various subgroups of Christians and Jews.  But unlike in the 1950s, 
today we have as many Muslims as Jews, along with a large and 
complex array of Buddhists and Hindus.78  Other religious traditions are 
well represented as well, including, among others, Jain, Sikh, 
Zoroastrian, African, and Afro-Caribbean.79  And Christianity and 
Judaism have not escaped the diversifying effects of immigration.  To 
note but one example, Roman Catholicism has taken on an increasingly 
Hispanic flavor.80  Moreover, as we look to the future, there is no 
reason to believe that America’s “exploding religious pluralism”81 will 
not continue.  If anything, this trend is likely to accelerate as the 
demographics of the nation continue to evolve. 
 72 See Stephen J. Stein, Religion/Religions in the United States: Changing Perspectives and 
Prospects, 75 IND. L.J. 37, 41-52 (2000).  Professor Stein’s account is considerably more 
complete and nuanced than the brief summary I offer here. 
 73 See id. at 41-43. 
 74 See id. at 45-46, 48. 
 75 See id. at 45. 
 76 WILL HERBERG, PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC-JEW (1955). 
 77 DIANA L. ECK, A NEW RELIGIOUS AMERICA: HOW A “CHRISTIAN COUNTRY” HAS NOW 
BECOME THE WORLD’S MOST RELIGIOUSLY DIVERSE NATION 4 (2001); see id. at 4-5 
(“[N]owhere, even in today’s world of mass migrations, is the sheer range of religious faith as 
wide as it is today in the United States.”). 
 78 See id. at 2-4. 
 79 See id. at 1, 4.  There are far too many smaller religious groups to mention.  For 
comprehensive documentation and detailed discussion, see MELTON’S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
AMERICAN RELIGIONS (J. Gordon Melton ed., 8th ed. 2009). 
 80 See ECK, supra note 77, at 3, 45. 
 81 Stein, supra note 72, at 52. 
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B.     Modernization 
 
Second, beyond these dramatic changes in formal religious 
affiliation, the forces of modernity have acted and continue to act within 
the various faiths, promoting increasingly modernized versions of 
religion, versions that comfortably coexistent with modern science and 
secular rationality.  Calling oneself a Christian or a Jew or a Sikh is one 
thing; the actual character of one’s beliefs and practices is something 
else.  Within American Christianity, for example, many Americans 
continue to adhere to classic understandings of the faith, whether 
Roman Catholic or Protestant.  Many others, by contrast, count 
themselves Christians even though their beliefs are decidedly 
unorthodox, certainly by historical standards.  To a significant extent, 
these revisionist belief structures are modernized—in a sense, 
secularized—versions of Christianity.  They are attractive to individuals 
who wish to embrace the tradition and ethics of Christianity despite 
their skepticism concerning the otherworldly and miraculous aspects of 
the faith, including the existence of a personal, omnipotent, and 
transcendent God. 
Modernized, metaphorical understandings of religion are not new.  
Within American Protestantism, for example, liberal theologians began 
moving in this direction as far back as the nineteenth century.82  By the 
1940s, Paul Tillich went further, famously proclaiming that God should 
no longer be understood “as a projection ‘out there’ or beyond the skies 
but as the ground of our very being.”83  And “if that word [God] has not 
much meaning for you,” Tillich continued, “translate it, and speak of 
the depths of your life, and the source of your being, of your ultimate 
concern, of what you take seriously without any reservation.”84  In 
recent decades, modernized understandings of religion have become 
increasingly common, especially within mainline Protestantism but also 
more generally.  As Frederick Mark Gedicks and Roger Hendrix report, 
it is not unusual today for mainline Protestants—and to some extent 
even Evangelicals—to be “skeptical about the divinity of Jesus, oppose 
literal-historical understandings of the Bible, and reject Jesus’s 
miracles, including the resurrection.”85  These individuals, among 
others, fall into a group of Americans that Gedicks and Hendrix 
 82 See GEORGE M. MARSDEN, UNDERSTANDING FUNDAMENTALISM AND EVANGELICALISM 
32-36 (1991). 
 83 PAUL TILLICH, THE SHAKING OF THE FOUNDATIONS 57 (1948). 
 84 Id. 
 85 Frederick Mark Gedicks & Roger Hendrix, Uncivil Religion: Judeo-Christianity and the 
Ten Commandments, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 275, 288 (2007). 
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provocatively label the “barely believing.”86  The increasing prevalence 
of such religious understandings, whether Christian or otherwise, 
represents an important development that is likely to continue. 
 
C.     Individualization 
 
Third, American religion has been and continues to be transformed 
in a related but distinctive way: It is becoming increasingly 
individualistic.  Thus, Americans are crafting their own understandings 
of religion, understandings that do not conform to the conventional 
beliefs and practices of any particular religious body or any particular 
religious faith.  In their celebrated book, Habits of the Heart,87 
Professor Robert N. Bellah and his coauthors identified a paradigmatic 
example of this tendency in a young woman the authors interviewed, a 
woman they called “Sheila Larson.”  Asked to describe her faith, Sheila, 
although affirming a generalized belief in God, named her religion after 
herself.  “It’s ‘Sheilaism,’” she said, “just my own little voice.”88  
Sheila did not attend church, and, for her, believing in God did not carry 
a conventional religious meaning.89  Indeed, people like Sheila, whether 
or not they claim to believe in God, increasingly avoid the word 
“religious” altogether, describing themselves instead as “spiritual,” 
perhaps in part to avoid the implication that they feel bound by religious 
convention.90
In any event, as Professor Gedicks has explained, spirituality—
even for a person who continues to claim a religious identity or 
affiliation—tends to displace religion as traditionally understood.  
Traditional religion rests upon “teachings and doctrines conform[ing] to 
an external and ultimate divine reality,” a “reality beyond the temporal 
self.”91  Spirituality, by contrast, calls for an inwardly directed search 
for meaning, a “revelation of the immanent, rather than the 
transcendent.”92  As Professor Rebecca French has concluded, this 
“move towards a personalized spirituality,” with individuals 
 86 Id. at 287. 
 87 ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN 
AMERICAN LIFE (1985). 
 88 Id. at 220-21. 
 89 See id. 
 90 See Stein, supra note 72, at 58.  In a 2009 survey, a remarkable 30% of Americans 
described themselves as “spiritual but not religious.”  Daniel Stone, One Nation Under God?, 
NEWSWEEK (Apr. 7, 2009), http://www.newsweek.com/2009/04/06/one-nation-under-god.html. 
 91 Gedicks, supra note 71, at 1218, 1219. 
 92 Id. at 1219; see id. at 1215-19; cf. ROBERT WUTHNOW, AFTER HEAVEN: SPIRITUALITY IN 
AMERICA SINCE THE 1950S, at 3 (1998) (arguing that “people have been losing faith in a 
metaphysic that can make them feel at home in the universe” and have been increasingly driven 
toward a “spirituality of seeking”). 
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constructing their own belief structures and “designer Gods,” is an 
ongoing development no less dramatic than other recent changes in the 
American religious landscape.93
 
D.     Secularization 
 
Fourth, and finally, there are growing numbers of Americans who 
are frankly and openly secular, abandoning religious or spiritual 
outlooks or practices altogether.  Americans remain far more religious 
and religiously active than citizens in other Western countries, but our 
unusual degree of religiosity may not be enduring.  According to Trinity 
College’s 2008 American Religious Identification Survey (ARIS),94 a 
dramatic decline in religious identification and practice has occurred 
over the last two decades.95  In 1990, only 8.1% of Americans identified 
their religion as “none,” “atheist,” “agnostic,” “secular,” or 
“humanist.”96  By 2008, the percentage of these so-called “Nones” had 
almost doubled to 15%, which is nearly a sixth of the American 
population and which far exceeds the combined total of all non-
Christian religious groups in the United States.97  Most of the growth in 
Nones occurred in the 1990s,98 but it is notable that in the 2008 survey, 
young adults, ages eighteen to twenty-nine, were especially inclined to 
self-identify in this fashion, with 22% falling into this category.99  
According to the ARIS researchers, trend lines suggest that in another 
twenty years Nones could constitute as much as a quarter of the overall 
American population.100
 93 Rebecca French, Shopping for Religion: The Change in Everyday Religious Practice and 
Its Importance to the Law, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 127, 162, 167 (2003); see id. at 162-67.  The 
contemporary trend toward individualistic religion can be seen to have deep historical roots, in 
what Charles Taylor has described as the turn toward inwardness in Western understandings of 
morality.  See CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF MODERN IDENTITY 
109-207 (1989). 
 94 See BARRY A. KOSMIN & ARIELA KEYSAR, AMERICAN RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION 
SURVEY [ARIS 2008]: SUMMARY REPORT (2009), available at 
http://www.americanreligionsurvey-aris.org/reports/ARIS_Report_2008.pdf. 
 95 See BARRY A. KOSMIN ET AL., AMERICAN NONES: THE PROFILE OF THE NO RELIGION 
POPULATION, A REPORT BASED ON THE AMERICAN RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION SURVEY 2008 
(2009), available at http://www.americanreligionsurvey-aris.org/reports/NONES_08.pdf. 
 96 Id. at 20 fig.3.1.  The question was: “What is your religion, if any?”  Individuals who 
responded with any of the five responses noted in the text were combined to form a group the 
researchers called the “Nones.”  Both in 1990 and in 2008, the ARIS researchers asked this and 
other questions of representative samples of American adults.  See id. at ii (discussing survey 
methodology). 
 97 Id. at 20 fig.3.1; see id. at i. 
 98 See id. at 20. 
 99 Id. at 17 fig.2.1. 
 100 See id. at 22. 
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These statistics are more complex than they might seem.  As the 
researchers explain, only a small percentage of the Nones are atheists, 
and, indeed, about a fourth of them are theists who affirm a personal 
God even though they reject conventional religious labels.101  (Perhaps 
“Sheila,” for example, would self-identify as a “None.”)  Even so, a 
broad majority of Nones are rational skeptics who reject theism.  Thus, 
7% are atheists; 35% are agnostics; and 24% are deists who deny the 
existence of a personal God.102
Beyond the question of religious self-identification, the ARIS 
survey included additional questions relating to specific beliefs and 
practices.  One important finding, for example, is that fully 27% of all 
Americans—regardless of their stated religious affiliation—said that 
they did not expect to have a religious funeral when they die.103  This 
statistic speaks volumes about the declining significance of traditional 
religious worldviews in the United States, even for individuals who may 
continue to self-identify as “religious.”  As Barry Kosmin, coauthor of 
the ARIS study, observes: “If you don’t have a religious funeral, you’re 
probably not interested in heaven and hell.”104
It would be wrong to overstate the significance of the ARIS 
findings, but it seems that secularization, long anticipated in the United 
States, finally is making significant inroads.  America remains a broadly 
religious society.  We are not Western Europe.  But we may be moving 
slowly in that direction—in part through self-proclaimed hostility or 
indifference to religion but also in more subtle ways.  As I suggested in 
discussing the trend toward modernized religion, secularization can 
work within religion as well as outside it.  It can act to demythologize 
conventional religious claims, including supernatural claims about 
miracles, the afterlife, and divine intervention in human affairs.  As 
such, its effects include the rise of metaphorical understandings of 
religion, agnostic views about God, and deist beliefs, even among 
persons who continue to claim conventional religious affiliations.  Deist 
beliefs or tendencies, for example, can be found in nearly 30% of 
mainline Protestants and Roman Catholics and in more than 40% of 
Jews.105  More broadly, those holding secularized beliefs—whether or 
 101 Id. at 11 fig.1.13. 
 102 Id.  The researchers subdivide the 35% of Nones who are agnostics into “hard agnostics” 
(those who say “there is no way to know” about the existence of God) (19% of the Nones) and 
“soft agnostics” (those who say “I’m not sure” about the existence of God) (16%).  Id. 
 103 Id. at 13 fig.1.16; see id. at 12-13.  Among Nones, 66% responded in this manner.  See id. 
 104 Survey: U.S. Grows Less Religious, Less Christian, CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Apr. 7, 2009, at 
15 (quoting Barry Kosmin). 
 105 See BAYLOR INST. FOR STUDIES OF RELIGION, AMERICAN PIETY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: 
NEW INSIGHTS INTO THE DEPTH AND COMPLEXITY OF RELIGION IN THE US 27, 30 (2006), 
available at http://www.baylor.edu/content/services/document.php/33304.pdf (finding that one in 
four Americans—including nearly 30% of mainline Protestants and Roman Catholics and over 
40% of Jews—believe in a “Distant God” who is not active in the world). 
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not they affirm some notion of God or a higher power—are likely to 
deny or reject any personal relationship with God, any role for God in 
their own or the world’s temporal affairs, and any need to honor a 
distinctively religious set of moral or ethical commands, understood as 
transcendent, externally imposed duties or obligations. 
 
V.     CAN RELIGIOUS LIBERTY SURVIVE? 
 
To recapitulate, contemporary American society has undergone 
and continues to undergo four significant and interrelated 
developments: first, a radical increase in religious diversity as measured 
by religious identification or affiliation; second, the modernization of 
traditional faiths, with rationalism and metaphor tending to displace the 
supernatural, miraculous, and otherworldly aspects of religion; third, the 
individualization and “spiritualization” of religion, including a turn 
toward the self and away from transcendent or even group-based 
religious norms; and fourth, the increasing secularization of individual 
belief structures, not only among professed nonbelievers but also among 
individuals who continue to claim a religious identification or 
affiliation.  These four trends, taken together, have important 
implications for religious liberty. 
 
A.     Threats to Religious Liberty’s Political-Pragmatic  
Foundation 
 
One thing is clear from the first trend but also from the others: 
American religion today is astonishingly diverse, not only in formal 
religious identification but also, and even more, in the broad range of 
religious and spiritual beliefs that individuals actually hold.  At first 
glance, this dramatic increase in religious diversity should offer 
enhanced support for religious liberty under the political-pragmatic 
justification originally advanced by Locke in his second argument.  As 
suggested earlier, the greater the degree of religious pluralism, the 
stronger the argument that religious liberty will further political stability 
and social peace.  To the extent that the state embraces religious liberty, 
it signals its respect for the beliefs and practices of religious individuals 
(and of secular individuals likewise), including those holding minority 
or unconventional views.  This leads in turn to their reciprocal respect 
and support for the state and to harmony within society.  As the 
population of religious minorities and nonconformists grows, so, too, 
does the positive societal impact of religious liberty. 
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Locke’s political-pragmatic argument makes good sense, and it has 
strongly influenced the spread of religious liberty.  But there may be a 
point of diminishing returns, or even a point at which radical religious 
pluralism leads instead to a contrary political-pragmatic position.  As 
Professor Stein has noted, religious diversity in the contemporary 
United States is “genuinely bewildering,”106 making free exercise “a 
glorious principle” but “a wild thing” in practice.107  Even if religious 
liberty can promote societal harmony and peace, implementation 
difficulties may become too great and the practical costs too high. 
Two practical problems loom large: the legal definition of 
“religion” and, relatedly, the societal costs of extending protection to all 
manner of “religiously” motivated conduct.  Amid the welter of 
contemporary belief systems, it has become increasingly difficult to 
define “religion” in any coherent fashion.108  For purposes of religious 
liberty, one could attempt to confine “religion” to conventional 
understandings, but that path seems increasingly arbitrary.  
“Conventional” religious believers—mainline Protestants and liberal 
Catholics, for example—may forego otherworldly explanations and 
guide their behavior by rational inquiry.  Meanwhile, “spiritual” 
believers may feel conscientiously obliged to honor “designer Gods” of 
all sorts.109
 In today’s America, writes Stein, “[r]eligion has become 
whatever a person declares to be the object of regard or pursuit.”110  A 
principled approach to religious liberty perhaps could limit “religion” to 
claims of conscience, but it otherwise might require a “fluid 
definition”111 along the lines that Stein suggests.  Yet if “religion” 
extends so broadly, why should avowedly secular claims—claims of 
personal autonomy, for example—not be treated likewise?112  And even 
if secular claims are somehow excluded, the “religion” that remains 
would nonetheless be capacious—arguably too broad to permit any 
serious degree of constitutional or legal protection. 
These practical problems, of course, already have influenced the 
direction of constitutional doctrine under the Free Exercise Clause, 
including the Supreme Court’s restrictive decision in Employment 
 106 Stein, supra note 72, at 41. 
 107 Id. at 60. 
 108 See GRIFFIN, supra note 13, at 15-35; Daniel O. Conkle, The Path of American Religious 
Liberty: From the Original Theology to Formal Neutrality and an Uncertain Future, 
75 IND. L.J. 1, 28-32 (2000). 
 109 Cf. WUTHNOW, supra note 92, at 2 (“Spirituality has become a vastly complex quest in 
which each person seeks in his or her own way.”). 
 110 Stein, supra note 72, at 58. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Cf. William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 
58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308, 319-23 (1991) (contending that religious belief systems should not 
receive greater constitutional protection than non-religious belief systems). 
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Division v. Smith,113 which ruled that religiously motivated conduct 
generally is not entitled to presumptive constitutional protection.  
Departing from prior doctrine, the Court reasoned that such protection 
was impractical in a nation “of almost every conceivable religious 
preference”114 and that, indeed, affording such protection would be 
“courting anarchy,” a “danger [that] increases in direct proportion to the 
society’s diversity of religious beliefs.”115  In the future, these practical 
considerations could threaten religious liberty more generally.  For 
example, concerns similar to those expressed in Smith could influence 
the interpretation of religious liberty statutes such as RFRA and 
RLUIPA, or they might some day lead to their repeal, or perhaps their 
judicial invalidation under the Establishment Clause.116
 
B.     Threats to Religious Liberty’s Religious-Moral Foundation 
 
The societal developments I have identified also bear upon Locke’s 
first and primary argument for religious liberty—his religious-moral 
justification—as well as Christian and non-Christian variants of that 
argument.  Whatever its particular formulation, Christian theology, at 
bottom, supports religious liberty on the ground that Christianity 
demands it as a matter of religious truth.  In other words, God demands 
it.  Non-Christian religious traditions offer distinctive rationales but 
nonetheless support—or can be understood to support—religious liberty 
on the basis that it is required as a matter of religious truth and therefore 
as a matter of core conviction.  As a result, the rise of an increasingly 
non-Christian religious pluralism in the United States need not impair 
the religious-moral case for religious liberty. 
The other trends I have noted, however, may undermine the vitality 
of these religious-moral justifications.  These trends include a rising 
secularism in individual belief structures, not only among professed 
nonbelievers but also among individuals who continue to claim a 
religious identification or affiliation.  Relatedly, those claiming 
traditional religious identifications, for example, mainline Protestants, 
may understand religion in modernistic, metaphorical ways, effectively 
 113 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 114 Id. at 888 (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 115 Id. 
 116 Cf. Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Forms and Limits of Religious Accommodation: 
The Case of RLUIPA, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1907, 1926-31 (2011) (suggesting that the 
“substantial burden” provisions of RLUIPA, along with similar provisions in RFRA and 
comparable state statutes, are constitutionally suspect under the Establishment Clause because 
they invite or require a constitutionally impermissible inquiry into the religious meaning or 
significance of particular religious practices). 
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limiting themselves to beliefs that are consistent with secular rationality.  
The remaining trend, the individualization and spiritualization of 
religious beliefs, likewise reflects a decline in traditional understandings 
of religion. 
Rising secularism, by definition, undercuts any religious-moral 
argument for religious liberty.117  This plainly is true for overt 
secularists, who have no religious tradition or religious resources upon 
which to draw.118  Metaphorical religious believers do have a religious 
tradition and resources upon which to draw, but their modernistic 
religious understandings may or may not generate a profound or 
fundamental commitment to religious liberty, a commitment akin to 
Roger Williams’s belief that coerced religion “stinks in God’s 
nostrils.”119  Religious or spiritual believers holding individualized 
belief structures, by contrast, tend to reject or distrust traditional 
religious theology and doctrines altogether, presumably including the 
traditional religious rationales for religious liberty.  In fact, their 
detachment from organized religion increases the likelihood that they 
are completely unaware of these traditional rationales.  Given their 
distrust of traditional religion, moreover, they are likely to reject any 
distinctive constitutional or legal protection for religious beliefs or 
practices as such,120 although they might well support a more 
generalized protection of personal freedom and individual autonomy.121
 117 In addition to rising secularism, recent decades have witnessed an increasing privatization 
of religion and corresponding secularization of legal and public discourse.  As Professor Steven 
D. Smith has explained, the secularization of legal and public discourse should be distinguished 
from secularization as such, but it too tends to impair the viability of religious-moral justifications 
for religious liberty.  See Smith, supra note 32, at 167-96; see also STEVEN D. SMITH, THE 
DISENCHANTMENT OF SECULAR DISCOURSE 107-50 (2010) (arguing that secular discourse is 
subverting religious freedom by rendering its justification incoherent). 
 118 Professor Alan E. Brownstein has argued that secularists might be persuaded by a 
religious-moral argument for religious liberty, or at least by an argument that bridges religious 
and secular understandings.  See Alan E. Brownstein, Justifying Free Exercise Rights, 
1 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 504, 515-23 (2003).  Brownstein contends that the most broadly 
persuasive religious-moral argument for religious liberty is one that conceptualizes religious 
duties as emanating not from externally imposed commands, but rather from internally derived, 
relational obligations to the divine, obligations grounded on a relationship of love.  See id. at 517-
21.  Secularists, he suggests, are more likely to understand the importance of loving relationships 
and the duties that they inspire.  See id. at 521-23.  Brownstein’s argument is imaginative and 
helpful.  It might persuade some secularists, mitigating the effect that I describe in the text. 
 119 See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 120 According to Professor Gedicks, “the instinct of spirituality is for religious liberty in its 
classic form, as the residuum of governmental absence.”  Gedicks, supra note 71, at 1234.  By 
this, however, Gedicks means nothing more than a restrictive, nondiscrimination approach to the 
Free Exercise Clause, as expounded in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).  See 
Gedicks, supra note 71, at 1226-29, 1234.  Gedicks does not discuss religious liberty statutes 
such as RFRA and RLUIPA, which authorize religion-based exemptions from nondiscriminatory 
laws; however, his argument implies that these statutes are problematic—if not 
unconstitutional—in an era of increasing spirituality and declining traditional religion. 
 121 In selected settings, the Supreme Court has extended constitutional protection to individual 
autonomy, whether religiously informed or not.  Notably, the Court’s reasoning has included the 
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C.     A Secular-Moral Foundation for Religious Liberty? 
 
Declining support for religious liberty as a matter of religious-
moral principle might not be cause for concern if there were a 
persuasive secular-moral justification for religious liberty.  But it is 
doubtful that such a justification exists. 
Whether any human rights can be defended on the basis of secular 
morality is an open question.  As Professor Robert Traer has written, 
“faith in human rights reflects a convergence of the religious wisdom of 
the world . . . , affirming a ‘higher law’ [that] recognizes the dignity of 
the human person as the purpose and standard of all law.”122  According 
to Traer, “[i]t is faith in the power of love, which [Martin Luther King, 
Jr.] described as a ‘Hindu-Muslim-Christian-Jewish-Buddhist belief 
about ultimate reality.’”123  Human rights are grounded in the inherent 
dignity and inviolability of each and every human being, without 
exception.  As Professor Michael J. Perry has explained, these 
fundamental premises can readily be justified by religious worldviews, 
including, for example, worldviews that include the belief that every 
human being is a child of God who warrants our love and respect as a 
sacred and beloved brother or sister.124  Conversely, Perry continues, 
despite the arguments of prominent philosophers, it is not at all clear 
that secular morality is up to the task.125
language of individual self-definition and spirituality.  In protecting abortion decision-making, for 
example, the Court has cited “the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of 
the universe, and of the mystery of human life” as well as a woman’s right to determine her “own 
conception of her spiritual imperatives.”  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
851-52 (1992). 
 122 TRAER, supra note 67, at 219-21. 
 123 Id. at 221 (quoting Martin Luther King, Jr., A Time to Break Silence, Speech Delivered at 
a Meeting of Clergy and Laity Concerned at Riverside Church in New York City (Apr. 4, 1967), 
reprinted in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 
231, 242 (James Melvin Washington ed., 1986)). 
 124 See MICHAEL J. PERRY, TOWARD A THEORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS: RELIGION, LAW, 
COURTS 7-13 (2007).  An expansive interpretation of the Establishment Clause might suggest that 
religious-moral arguments along these lines cannot be used to justify the recognition of human 
rights in the American legal system, but such an interpretation would be seriously misguided.  See 
Thomas C. Berg, The Pledge of Allegiance and the Limited State, 8 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 41, 64-
67 (2003). 
 125 See PERRY, supra note 124, at 14-29.  Perry concedes that apart from arguments of 
morality, there are political-pragmatic arguments (what he calls “self-interested” arguments) for 
the protection of human rights, but he doubts their sufficiency.  See Michael J. Perry, Secular 
Worldviews, Religious Worldviews, and the Morality of Human Rights, in THE ROUTLEDGE 
COMPANION TO THEISM (Charles Taliaferro et al. eds., forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 20-22), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1615690; cf. GLENN TINDER, LIBERTY: RETHINKING AN 
IMPERILED IDEAL 118 (2007) (“That every person without exception must be respected is 
probably the central principle of Western morality . . . . [but i]t is uncertain . . . whether that 
principle can survive if it comes to depend on reason alone, unsupported by faith.”). 
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Even assuming, pace Perry, that some human rights can be 
grounded in secular morality, religious liberty is a separate and even 
more difficult question.  Religious liberty calls for special and 
distinctive protection for beliefs and practices that secular thinkers do 
not regard as special or distinctive, certainly not in a positive way.126  
As a result, secular-moral arguments for religious liberty are likely to 
founder.127  Indeed, if Professor Steven D. Smith is correct, under “the 
constraints of modern secular discourse . . . there simply is no good 
justification for treating religion as a special legal category.”128
The best secular case for religious liberty might rest on a 
combination of political-pragmatic and secular-moral justifications.  
Professor Douglas Laycock, for example, has argued that religious 
liberty protects a fundamental component of personal autonomy, 
promotes societal peace, and removes the government from issues over 
which it generally has little or no legitimate interest.129  Arguments of 
this sort certainly have force, but, when analyzed closely, their 
rationales tend to point toward a zone of liberty that is not confined to 
religious beliefs and conduct.  As a result, they tend not to support 
religious liberty as a special and distinctive human right.130  In any 
event, it seems doubtful that any combination of political-pragmatic or 
secular-moral arguments could provide as potent a justification for 
religious liberty as do arguments grounded in the deep convictions of 
religious morality.131
 126 See Brian Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion?, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 1 (2008) (contending that 
there is no principled argument for tolerating religion except as part of a broader liberty of 
conscience and that, even within that broader category, religion’s distinguishing features may 
suggest the need for greater limits, not greater tolerance). 
 127 See STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL 
PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 77-117 (1995); cf. Griffin, supra note 16, at 32-34, 43-44 
(offering a non-religious, Rawlsian justification for constitutional toleration, but explaining that 
this argument would confine religious liberty to the restrictive, nondiscrimination approach of 
Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)). 
 128 Steven D. Smith, Discourse in the Dusk: The Twilight of Religious Freedom?, 
122 HARV. L. REV. 1869, 1884 (2009) (book review); see id. at 1883-87. 
 129 See Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 313, 
316-23 (1996). 
 130 See Smith, supra note 32, at 196-223 (systematically critiquing secular arguments for 
religious liberty, including arguments similar to Laycock’s, and finding them insufficient to 
justify distinctive protection for religious liberty as such). 
 131 Cf. Laycock, supra note 129, at 323 (conceding that his secular defense of religious liberty 
“may seem thin to some” but claiming that “thick or thin, its great advantage is that it is not 
dependent on beliefs about religion”). 





The Lockean revolution fueled the emergence and growth of 
religious liberty.  Due to the increasingly widespread acceptance of 
religious-moral justifications combined with an increasingly persuasive 
political-pragmatic justification, religious liberty rested on foundations 
that seemed ever more secure.  By the late twentieth century, these 
foundations were sufficient to support a vibrant regime of religious 
liberty in the United States, including distinctive constitutional and legal 
protection for religiously motivated conduct, even in the context of 
neutral, nondiscriminatory laws.  Employment Division v. Smith132 
marked a step in the opposite direction, but RFRA and RLUIPA, 
combined with state-law developments, countermanded Smith to a 
substantial degree.  More generally, some twenty years after Smith, 
America’s basic commitment to religious liberty remains intact. 
Even so, it seems that a counter-revolution is underway.  The 
political-pragmatic justification for religious liberty is being tested by 
radical religious and spiritual pluralism.  More important, the religious-
moral foundation of religious liberty—its strongest pillar of support—is 
being slowly eroded by the forces of secularization and by the decline 
of traditional religious understandings.  Religious liberty might survive 
for a time, perhaps for decades, as an inherited commitment.  But if the 
counter-revolution continues, it may lead to a far less generous regime 
of religious liberty and, eventually, the complete demise of religious 
liberty as a distinctive constitutional or legal right.  Viewed in this light, 
Smith might be a forerunner of far more dramatic developments to 
come. 
It is commonplace to observe that American religious liberty, 
including the separation of church and state, has served religion well, 
supporting and nourishing one of the most religious societies in the 
Western world.133  But I suspect that the causal link runs mainly in the 
opposite direction: It is America’s vibrant religiosity that has promoted 
and supported the cause of religious liberty.  And as our religiosity 
declines, so, too, might our support for religious liberty.  We might 
retain a strong—and potentially even stronger—separation of church 
and state, but it might no longer be linked to religious liberty.  Rather, it 
might be grounded on distrust of religion, or even hostility toward it.  
And religious free exercise, in the form of distinctive protection for 
 132 Smith, 494 U.S. 872. 
 133 See, e.g., McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 882 (2005) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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religiously motivated beliefs and conduct, might gradually fade from 
view.134
I earnestly hope that religious liberty can survive over time.  But 
preserving religious liberty will require more than vigilance.135  It will 
require us to reaffirm, reclaim, or replace the justifications that have 
long supported it.136  The threats of the future are real, and I am not 
optimistic.  I fear that religious liberty, understood as a distinctive and 
precious human right, our “first freedom,”137 might become a relic of 
the past—perhaps a cherished relic, but one that no longer commands a 
contemporary commitment. 
 134 If Europe is a harbinger for the United States, we might eventually come to justify the 
suppression of religious practices even through overtly discriminatory laws and even when the 
religious practices are purely symbolic.  Some European countries have moved in this direction, 
and the European Court of Human Rights has suggested that secularism itself can be a legitimate 
justification for such laws.  The most striking example is Sahin v. Turkey, 44 Eur. Ct. H.R. 5 
(2005).  In Sahin, on an overwhelming vote of sixteen to one, the court approved a Turkish 
regulation barring university students from wearing Islamic headscarves, finding that the 
intrusion on religious freedom was justified because it promotes secularism as well as gender 
equality.  See id. ¶¶ 112-123.  In its opinion, the court noted another highly publicized European 
law, the 2004 French law prohibiting the wearing of conspicuous religious apparel or symbols by 
public school students, and it suggested that the French law, like the Turkish regulation, was 
justified by “the principle of secularism.”  See id. ¶ 56. 
 135 Invoking the First Amendment, without more, will not be enough.  See Smith, supra note 
32, at 224.  But cf. Laycock, supra note 129, at 314 (contending that constitutionalism demands 
that we respect the First Amendment, whatever its underlying rationale, and that the Amendment 
itself thus gives us “sufficient reason to vigorously protect religious liberty”). 
 136 Cf. Brownstein, supra note 118, at 515-23 (suggesting that we should move toward 
defending religious liberty on the basis of arguments that bridge religious and secular rationales). 
 137 See Michael W. McConnell, Why Is Religious Liberty the “First Freedom”?, 21 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 1243 (2000). 
